Introduction
The international community has debated the need for international regulation and oversight of multinational companies for almost forty years.
1 While States have hitherto resisted the creation of an international legally binding instrument on the matter, voluntary 2 and soft-law 3 international instruments and initiatives of inter-governmental and multi-stakeholder origin have proliferated to support and encourage an environmentally sound conduct of multinational and other companies. This chapter seeks to trace the evolution of such international practice with a view to highlighting a progressive shift from purely voluntary approaches (corporate social responsibility or CSR 4 ) towards accountability mechanisms. To this end, the chapter will first briefly discuss the increasing convergence in the definition of international environmental standards for corporate accountability operated by a variety of international organisations and processes (12.1.). 5 It will then focus on the most recent discussion on human rights and corporate accountability, with a view to determining whether environmental protection concerns are adequately taken into account (12.2.). Attention will then concentrate on the growing number of international oversight and dispute avoidance mechanisms that provide a readily-available and impartial avenue for addressing individuals', communities' and civil society groups' complaints against private companies and the possibility for an international entity to operate on the ground for fact-finding and/or mediation purposes (12.3).
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Early attempts were undertaken in the context of the UN Economic and Social Council that adopted a resolution in 1972 acknowledging the lack of an international regulatory framework for multinational corporations and the need to institutionalise international debate on that issue: ECOSOC Res. This is the case of international standards on corporate environmental accountability elaborated in the context of international organisations, which will be discussed in detail in section 2 below.
In concluding, this contribution aims to bring to light an under-studied aspect of the proliferation of relevant international initiatives. An argument will be put forward that the risk of fragmentation of international guidance on corporate accountability due to the multiplicity of different international accountability processes now in existence is significantly mitigated by the convergence of the standards used to guide and assess private companies' conduct. Previous research of mine had indicated that international standardsetting initiatives were increasingly characterised by a significant degree of convergence. 6 In the early 2010s, this trend -as discussed in this contribution -has nothing but accelerated.
The complementary finding of the present study is that the outcomes of international monitoring activities, which are equally carried out by a plethora of different international actors, also show increasing signs of convergence and cross-fertilization. Notably, the environmental standards elaborated within the framework of the Convention on Biological Diversity, in particular environmental-cultural impact assessments and benefit-sharing, are referred to in the decisions of different international corporate accountability mechanisms.
This is a significant contribution to ensuring substantive unity 7 across different areas of international law, notably on the environment and on human rights, that may be negatively affected by the conduct of private operators (12.4).
From CSR to corporate accountability through converging substantive environmental standards
The term 'corporate accountability' was endorsed by the international community at the 2002
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), 8 and can be understood as a the legitimate expectation that reasonable efforts will be put in place, according to international standards, by private companies and foreign investors for the protection of a certain global interest or the attainment of a certain internationally agreed environmental objective. 9 The expectations and relevant international standards that make up corporate accountability in international environmental law have been gradually spelt out through various international processes, some of which pre-dated or ran in parallel with the WSSD. These processes are characterised by different approaches (regulation vs collaboration), nature (intergovernmental vs multi-stakeholder), and legal status (hard vs soft law). Nonetheless, upon 6 Morgera, above n 2. Morgera, above n 2, ch. 2.
closer inspection, they all build upon the same international standards for corporate environmental accountability. with reference to emission reduction, efficient resource use, the management of toxic disagree'. Compare with the understanding of prior informed consent proposed by the UN Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples' rights (discussed below), who clarified that prior informed consent does not provide indigenous people with a veto power when the State acts legitimately and faithfully in the public interest, but rather "establishes the need to frame consultation procedures in order to make every effort to build consensus on the part of all concerned" and that consensus-driven consultation processes should not only address measures to mitigate or compensate for adverse impacts of projects, but also explore and arrive at means of equitable benefit-sharing in a spirit of true partnership (Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34 (2009), para 48 and 53). 37 2012 IFC Performance Standard 7: Indigenous Peoples, above n 19, para 15. 38 Ibid., para. 12-13. 39 Ibid., para 18. change, biodiversity and resource efficiency, as well as to limit its impacts on ecosystem services, 43 and to reflect a human rights due diligence approach across its sustainability principles. 44 In the Performance Standards addressed to private companies, the IFC then introduced very detailed standards on climate change, including that the client implements 'technical and financially feasible and cost-effective options to reduce project-related greenhouse gas emissions during the design and operation of the project', as well as more specific obligations in case of projects expected or actually producing more than 25,000
tonnes of carbon-dioxide equivalent annually. 45 Resource efficiency also includes specific standards to reduce potentially significant water consumption and waste reduction, including 46 Ibid., para. 9, 12 and 17.
identified by their 'high conservation value' based on internationally recognised guidelines. 47 A new section on the management of ecosystem services has also been added, which calls upon the business entity to determine likely adverse impacts on ecosystem services, and systematically identify priority ecosystem services (either those having adverse impacts on affected communities or those on which the project will be directly dependent for its operations) with stakeholder participation. These are aimed to avoid negative impacts, or minimise them and implement measures to increase the operations' resource efficiency. 48 Furthermore, additional requirements have been put in place for clients engaged in primary production of living natural resources (including forestry, agriculture, animal husbandry, fisheries and aquaculture), particularly in the absence of appropriate and applicable global, regional or national standards. These additional requirements include: committing to applying international industry operating principles and good management practices and available technology; actively engaging and supporting the development of national standards, for the definition and demonstration of sustainable practices; and (as was the case in the previous version of the Standards) committing to achieving certification. 49 Finally, private companies are also expected to prefer suppliers that can demonstrate that they are not significantly impacting on natural or critical habitats.
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The 2011 review of two of the most influential international sets of corporate environmental accountability standards has therefore led to a sophistication of the preexisting procedural standards, bringing them into line with parallel developments related to business and human rights, and unprecedented guidance on substantive standards related to climate change, biodiversity and resource efficiency. ultimately to contribute to substantive unity across different areas of international law.
Business and Human

From CSR to Corporate Accountability Through Multiple Monitoring Mechanisms
Several international initiatives have not limited themselves to standard-setting for corporate environmental accountability, but have also put in place mechanisms to monitor corporate conduct and/or to consider complaints from members of the public. These are key steps in bringing to light instances of unsustainable corporate conduct or to proactively manage possible conflicts through an independent mechanism for assessing facts and facilitating the identification of constructive solutions. These mechanisms may provide a readily-available and impartial avenue for individuals, communities and civil society groups to have their 74 Ibid., para. 76-80. 75 The legal concept of benefit-sharing has been developed under the CBD not only in the context of access to genetic resources, but also with regard to the conservation and sustainable use of biological resources (such as protected areas, tourism, and forest management): see E Morgera and E Tsioumani, 'The Evolution of Benefit-sharing: Linking Biodiversity and Community Livelihoods" complaints against private companies heard, going beyond the hurdles and bias that may be experienced in accessing justice at the national level. These mechanisms may also serve the legitimate interests of private companies to have allegations against them assessed by an independent entity through their fact-finding activities on the ground, and through the good offices of an independent mediator in helping prevent conflicts from emerging or escalating.
From a broader perspective, these mechanisms also offer concrete opportunities to test the suitability of corporate environmental accountability standards, further clarifying the conditions for their applicability to private companies in different contexts. Furthermore, they may contribute to ensure a coherent approach to corporate accountability, by making systematic reference to those international standards that emerge as common from different international standard-setting initiatives.
Four illustrations of such international mechanisms will be offered in the following sub-sections, focusing first, more briefly, on the more recent system for handling allegations 
The Global Compact's Integrity Measures
The UN Global Compact, even if it was 'not designed, nor does it have the mandate or resources, to monitor or measure participants' performance,' 78 has developed a procedure to principles of the initiative. 81 According to the procedure, any written complaint can be submitted by any individual, organisation or state to the Global Compact Office, which will require the relevant company to provide written comments and keep it informed of action undertaken to address the situation. While the Office will not make any assessment of its own as to the matter at hand, it will provide guidance and assistance to the company in taking action to remedy the situation. More interestingly, the Office can also, including of its own initiative, refer the matter to the relevant UN entity (in the case of environmental principles, the UN Environment Programme) for advice, assistance or action; or refer the matter to the Global
Compact Board, to draw on its business members' expertise. The Office may further share with parties information about the compliance procedure under the OECD Guidelines (discussed below), which could provide for some cooperation, or at least some linkages between two distinct international accountability processes. If a company refuses to engage in dialogue within two months or if the review of the complaint reveals something detrimental to the reputation and integrity of the Global Compact, the Office will remove the company from its list of participants. 82 Overall, the procedure has been described, in low-key terms, as a 'dialogue facilitation mechanism,' 83 and it has already been suggested that the mechanism could be strengthened by empowering the Global Compact Office to 'mediate the process and seek to define conditions to be met by companies in order to remain a Compact participant.' 84 While this mechanism has some potential to monitor private companies' compliance with the environmental principles of the Global Compact, information available on the complaints dealt with is at the time of writing very limited and would not allow a more detailed discussion in this chapter. This lack of transparency concerning the complaint procedure has already been highlighted within the UN System. 85 Information on integrity cases is being included in the Global Compact Annual Review starting from the 2009 edition, but to date these reports have limited themselves to note the number of cases received and handled by the Global Compact Office, 86 without providing any further information -not even with reference to the specific principles that were alleged to be seriously violated by the company. This practice can be contrasted with that of the implementation procedure of the OECD Guidelines, discussed below: although until mid-2000s the OECD did not publish the names of companies involved in instances under consideration by its implementation procedure, it provided an annual update of the status of each instance with specific reference to the guideline alleged to be non-complied. This was, however, largely considered insufficient, and an NGO named "OECDWatch" started to independently produce quarterly updates on the filing, conclusion or rejections of instances. 
Communications to the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples' Rights
Attention can now turn to the incipient practice of UN Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples'
Rights in addressing communications on alleged violations of indigenous rights. 88 In his first report to the General Assembly, James Anaya prioritised among four areas for his work, the task of responding on an ongoing basis to specific cases of alleged human rights violations, Anaya's monitoring and normative work appear to converge in his recognition that 'in its prevailing form, the model for advancing natural resource extraction within the territories of indigenous peoples appears to run counter to the self-determination of indigenous peoples in the political, social and economic spheres.' 94 This conclusion led the Special Rapporteur to request in 2011 a mandate to elaborate a set of guidelines providing specific orientation to 90 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people: Observaciones sobre la situación de los derechos de los pueblos indígenas de Guatemala en relación con los proyectos extractivos, y otro tipo de proyectos, en sus territorios tradicionales, advance unedited version of 4 March 2011, para 69. 91 Ibid., para. 69-70. 92 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people: Observaciones sobre la situación de los derechos de los pueblos indígenas de Guatemala en relación con los proyectos extractivos, y otro tipo de proyectos, en sus territorios tradicionales, UN Doc. A/HRC/18/35/Add.3 (2011), para. 69-72. 93 Ibid., para. 89-93. 94 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, Extractive industries operating within or near indigenous territories, UN Doc. A/HRC/18/35 (2011), para. 82. governments, indigenous peoples and corporations regarding the protection of indigenous peoples' rights in the context of resource extraction or development projects. 
IFC Ombudsman
A more established practice can be studied in the context of the IFC Performance Standards.
Complaints from those affected by IFC-financed projects can be filed before a Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO), an independent oversight authority that reports directly to the President of the World Bank Group and that thus ascertains application of the IFC Standards to companies. 96 The CAO "attempts to resolve complaints through a flexible problem-solving approach and to enhance the environmental outcomes of the project" (Ombudsman function). 97 Any person, group or community affected, or likely to be affected, by a project is eligible, at anytime in the project, to file complaints that may relate to any aspect of the planning, implementation or impact of the project, without the need to allege necessarily violations of specific IFC procedures and standards. 98 When the complaint is accepted, the CAO decides the best course of action. Besides seeking to resolve issues for individuals who are directly or likely to be directly affected by IFC projects, CAO is also mandated to provide IFC with policy and process advice on environmental and social performance, and conduct environmental and social audits and reviews as an aid to institution learning (Compliance function). CAO can thus decide to resolve a complaint by undertaking a compliance audit or exercising advisory functions instead of its Ombudsman functions. In the latter cases, the complainant no longer controls the process.
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The Ombudsman's modus operandi includes field visits to the site of contested projects and interviews with all parties involved: staff of the private company, local authorities, affected communities representatives, other relevant local organisations and IFC staff.
Complaints, reports of field missions and recommendations are all published on the CAO website, together with updates on ongoing investigations. 100 Among these, the most 95 Ibid., para. 74-75. 96 2012 IFC Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability, above n 35, para. 54-57. 97 Ibid. , available online at www.ciel.org/Publications/CAOhandbook.pdf ('CIEL Handbook'), at 5-6. 99 Ibid., at 8. 100 http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/html-english/ombudsman.htm, where all the CAO documents cited below can be found.
important document is the assessment report, which is intended both as a finding of facts by CAO in relation to allegations contained in the complaint, and as an assessment of the "ripeness" of any conflict or tension for resolution or management. 101 Interestingly, after considering complaints, the CAO formulates recommendations not only to IFC itself, but also directly to the private company involved, albeit such recommendations will then need to be endorsed by the IFC President. The latter would then transmit them to the private company and/or request the IFC to take the appropriate action.
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In a complaint regarding a hydropower project in India, 103 for instance, the CAO recommended the company to provide for an independent study of environmental concerns, make it public, ensure the public monitoring of resulting commitments, and generally engage more constructively local communities also through the intermediation of independent facilitators or observers. The CAO further called for developing a schedule for implementation of commitments resulting from the environmental impact assessment on the basis of each of the IFC performance standards. 104 In addition, the CAO provided for both the IFC and the private company to engage in quality monitoring. The IFC, in turn, was requested to appoint an independent engineer to oversee the project and report on social and environmental matters, while the company was requested to report to IFC on a quarterly and annual basis on social, environmental and health issues. 105 In several instances, the Ombudsman considered whether the private company had undertaken an appropriate environmental impact assessment and whether the IFC had appropriately reviewed such assessment. 106 In other instances, the Ombudsman even concluded that in the absence of formal non-compliance with IFC standards, companies should still build a climate of trust and understanding with local communities with regards to the environmental impacts of the project. 107 One of the most striking features of the CAO's recommendations is thus the paramount attention devoted to the perception of the environmental and social performance of IFC-funded projects by local communities.
The CAO also undertook follow-up monitoring and site visits, 108 and where possible, it also engaged directly in the resolution of complaints, facilitating an agreement between the private sector and the complainants. 109 
OECD Guidelines Implementation Procedure
Although the OECD Guidelines are not as explicit or detailed with regard to corporate environmental accountability standards than the IFC, their implementation procedure has contributed on occasions to flesh out the links between corporate accountability and multilateral environmental agreements. The procedure 114 is based on the creation of national the national level. 115 The procedure is subject to the oversight by the OECD Investment Committee (CIME), which issues clarifications (providing additional information about whether and how the Guidelines apply to a particular business situation, without assessing the appropriateness of that enterprise's conduct), reviews the Guidelines and is ultimately responsible for their interpretation. 116 Specific instances are basically a means for any 'interested party' to draw the NCP's attention to a company's alleged non-observance of the Guidelines. 117 NCPs make an initial assessment of the issue and then offer their services as mediators. If the conflict is not resolved, it can be referred to the CIME, where non-binding decisions are taken by consensus. In the vast majority of cases, however, the onus of attempting to resolve specific instances and ensuring the effectiveness of the Guidelines is largely upon NCPs. 118 Disappointment, however, has been expressed for quite some time about the weak implementation mechanism of the Guidelines, 119 including by the UN Special Representative on Human Rights. 120 The lack of predictable timelines for NCPs to acknowledge receipt of, or respond to, instances in an efficient and timely manner also raised concerns. Specifically, the NCP used the CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines to interpret the OECD Guidelines provisions on consultations on environmental impacts, 129 to determine that Vedanta did not employ the local language or means of communication other than written form for consultations with communities with very high rate of illiteracy. It also found that the environmental impact assessment that had been carried out, although including an analysis of the "socio-economic environment" of the study area, did not address the impact of the mine on the community. 130 The NCP concluded that the company did not carry out adequate or timely consultations about the potential environmental impact of the construction of the mine on them. with the indigenous group on access to the project affected area, ways to secure its traditional livelihood, and alternative arrangements (other than re-settlement) for the affected families according to the process outlined in the CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines. At a minimum, the NCP expected Vedanta to advertise the consultation in a language and form that could be easily understood by the Dongria Kondh, thereby ensuring the participation of the maximum number of their representatives in the consultation 132 Interestingly, the NCP also underlined that in carrying out a human rights impact assessment, as suggested by the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights, the Akwé: Kon Guidelines could be used as a point of reference, particularly for carrying out indigenous groups' impact assessments.
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The follow-up statement by the NCP, however, provided a mixed picture, with the NGO claiming that no change in the company's conduct could be detected while Vedanta reported on specific action being undertaken following consultations with affected communities, and no comment provided by the NCP. 
Biological Diversity
Although the multiplicity of international standard-setting and monitoring mechanisms related to corporate accountability inevitably creates the risk of fragmentation of international guidance on corporate accountability, the above discussion has clarified that such risk is significantly mitigated by the convergence of the standards used to assess private companies' conduct. In particular, environmental standards for corporate accountability have explicitly or implicitly facilitated progress in standard-setting and influenced the international debate on corporate accountability tout court, by providing key elements of the due diligence framework on business and human rights such as impact assessment, stakeholder consultations, and more recently benefit-sharing. 132 Ibid, para. 138 Other guidelines may also be relevant for corporate environmental accountability purposes, such as those included in the CBD work programmes on protected areas, mountain and forest biodiversity. 139 All these instruments include specific procedures underpinning private companies' interactions with indigenous and local communities. 140 The CBD has thus provided a virtually universal forum for reaching intergovernmental consensus on standards for corporate environmental accountability with significant human rights dimensions. 141 This has occurred even before the Convention parties and Secretariat started activities specifically targeting the involvement of the business community into the CBD implementation in 2005. 142 Notably, according to the most recent decision of the CBD Conference of the Parties on the subject of private sector involvement, business entities are encouraged to monitor and assess impacts on biodiversity and ecosystem services, to develop and apply processes and production methods that minimise or avoid negative impacts on biodiversity, and 'take into account, as appropriate, the Akwé: Kon Guidelines.' 143 The CBD normative activity is particularly significant in supporting a coherent approach to corporate environmental accountability bridging human rights and environmental perspectives with its focus on indigenous and local communities, and covering several environmental issues in light of the ecosystem approach, 144 particularly with regard to consultation, impact assessment and benefit-sharing.
On the other hand, the CBD Secretariat has participated in various activities that directly engaged private companies, 145 such as collaboration with the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and an association of private enterprises that elaborated the Natural
Resources Stewardship Circle Declaration to provide guidance to the aromatic, perfume, and cosmetics industry interacting with indigenous peoples. 146 Another example concerns the BioTrade Initiative that was initiated under the aegis of the UN Commission on Trade and Development 147 to engage private companies to develop a verification framework that will formally recognise their efforts towards conservation, sustainability and benefit-sharing. 148 Several other initiatives 149 confirm that the CBD is not only contributing to the international debate on corporate accountability through standard-setting but also through direct engagement with the private sector. 151 More systematic documentation of the operations and findings of international accountability mechanisms, however, would help in coherently developing international quasi-caselaw on corporate environmental accountability. In part, this was reflected in the 2011 review of the OECD Guidelines, where emphasis was placed on collecting and making publicly available information on recent trends among NCPs and the establishment of a database on specific instances: OECD Guidelines Update 2011 -Note by the SecretaryGeneral, above n 31, at 29. 152 Note that the CBD is the only MEA cited in the list of international instruments of reference on which implementation of the OECD Guidelines should rely, together with an unclear reference to 'international treaties on persistent organic pollutants.' The Secretary-General's note stresses that 'the number of instruments and initiatives that are relevant to the Guidelines far surpasses the possibility for introducing explicit references to them in the text of the Guidelines. For this reason, there is general agreement that, as part of follow-up on the updated Guidelines, a resource document [will] be compiled…' (OECD Guidelines Update 2011 -Note by the Secretary-General, above n 31, at p. 6 and 9).
